Topic 11
Depth: Cost Cutting and Stagflation

Differential accumulation (revision)
- Capital as power: the long ascent
- Regimes: breadth and depth
- Depth: internal vs. external

Internal depth
- Cost reduction
- Differential input prices?
- Differential efficiency?
- Running on empty: “meeting the average”

External depth
- Differential inflation and differential stagflation
- The conventional creed: “Inflation is always an everywhere a distributional phenomenon”
- Framework: aggregate or disaggregate?
- Focus: inflation or power?

History and theory
- “Price revolutions”
- The deep roots of stagflation
- The special case of 20th-century inflation: magnitude and pattern
- The Great Depression: administered prices and the locus of sabotage
- The institutional underpinnings: big business, large governments, the larger use of credit
- The rise of organized power and stagflationary accumulation
- Stagflation as an “anomaly”?
- Power: distortion or rule?

The conventional creed
- The 19th century backdrop: competitive business, small government, gold standard
- Hume’s “classical dichotomy”: real vs. nominal
- Money, production and liquidity
- Liquidity and prices: which is the cause, which is the effect?

Keynesianism
- Keynes’ tradeoff: The General Theory and How to Pay for the War?
- The Phillips Curve
- Lipsey’s “general theory”
- Samuelson and Solow’s modification: from wages to prices
- A “menu of choices” and Kalecki’s political “business cycle”
- The new paradigm: “We are all Keynesians now”
- Fusing micro efficiency with government intervention
- Eating the cake and having it, too: power without redistribution?

Monetarism
- Expectations: economic agents strike back
- Friedman and Phelps: adaptive expectations and the vertical Philips Curve
- How long is the “short run”?
- What is the “normal rate of unemployment”?
- Rational expectations and the generator of history
- Muth, Sargent and Lucas: the collective economist as God
- Marrying subjective and objective probabilities
• *Laissez faire*, once more
• Expectations: from Keynes’ uncertainty to the New Classicists’ probability
• Ideology as science: “can the Phillips Curve theory ever be wrong?”

**Supply shocks**
• Stagflation: an upward sloping Phillips Curve?
• The postmodern “other”: blame it on the oil sheiks, the weather and the workers
• Oil sheiks and the whether: do raw material prices cause inflation?
• Do workers cause inflation?
• “Wage push” or “profit push”?

**Inflation and redistribution**
• Barking up the wrong tree: order or *creorder*?
• Inflation and structure, or inflation as restructuring?
• The disaggregate framework: identities, patterns, and the context of social restructuring
• Redistribution: capitalists contra workers
• Redistribution: large vs. small firms
• The imperative of sabotage
• Why stagflation – “return” and “risk”

**Regimes of differential accumulation**
• The pendulum of breadth and depth
FIGURE 1  Differential Capitalization and Differential Net Profit in the United States

* Ratio between the average market capitalization of the top 100 Compustat corporations (ranked annually by market capitalization) and the average market capitalization of all U.S. listed corporations.

** Ratio between the average net profit of the top 100 Compustat corporations (ranked annually by market capitalization) and the average net profit of all U.S. corporations (listed and unlisted). The number of U.S. corporations for 2004-2006 is extrapolated based on recent growth rates.

SOURCE: Compustat through WRDS (series codes: data25 for common shares outstanding; data199 for share price; data172 for net income); Global Financial Data (number of listed corporations on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ till 1989); World Federation of Exchanges (number of listed corporations on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ from 1990); U.S. Internal Revenue Service (number of corporate tax returns for active corporations); U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds through Global Insight (FL893064105 for market value of corporate equities); U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight (ZA for profit after taxes).
Differential Earnings

\[ earnings_D = employment_D \times \text{earnings per employees}_D \]

Table 1

Regimes of Differential Accumulation

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FIGURE 2   U.S. Accumulation: Internal vs. External Breadth

NOTE: Indicator is based on splicing of separate series.

“Running on empty”

“How do you build a company, when your buyers are infinitely knowledgeable and where your suppliers maintain a level playing field for your competitors? What remains your competitive differentiator or your source of value or whatever academic cliché you want to wrap around it?”


![Graph showing consumer prices in the U.K.](www.bnarchives.net)

**FIGURE 3** Consumer Prices in the U.K.

FIGURE 4 The Seeds of Differential Stagflation

FIGURE 5  Industrialized Countries: Long-Term Inflation and Growth

NOTE: Series are shown as 20-year moving averages. The trend line represents an OLS regression for the 1968–90 period.

SOURCE: IMF International Financial Statistics through Global Insight (series codes: L66&I@C110 for industrial production; L64@C110 for the consumer price index).
FIGURE 6  United States: Inflation and Growth, 1809-2007

NOTE: Series are shown as 20-year moving averages. The straight line running through the observations is drawn free hand for illustration purposes.

SOURCE: Historical data till 1928 are from Global Financial Data (series code: GDPUSAM for GDP). From 1929 onward, data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce through Global Insight (series codes: GDP for GDP; PDIGDP for the implicit GDP deflator).
FIGURE 7  Israel: Long-Term Inflation and Growth

NOTE: Series are shown as 5-year moving averages.

The neutrality of money

“There cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than money.”

John Stuart Mill

“Money is a veil.”

Irving Fisher

“Money is neutral, a veil with no consequences for real economic magnitudes.”

Franco Modigliani

“Inflation is always an everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”

Milton Friedman
The quantity theory of money

\[ P = \text{prices}, \quad T = \text{transactions}, \quad M = \text{money}, \quad V = \text{velocity}, \quad Q = \text{output}; \text{ lower case variables represent rates of change}\]

1. \[ P \times T = M \times V \]
2. \[ P = \frac{M \times V}{T} \]
3. \[ p \approx m + v - t \]
4. \[ p \approx m - t \quad ; \quad v = 0 \] (velocity hardly changes)
5. \[ p \approx m - q \quad ; \quad t = q \] (transaction growth is the same as output growth)

**FIGURE 8** United States: Liquidity and inflation

NOTE: Annual data smoothed as 5-year moving averages

SOURCE: IMF.
FIGURE 9  The Phillips Curve

From wage inflation to price inflation

$W$ is the wage rate, $U$ is the rate of unemployment, $P$ is the price level, $Q$ is output per worker (labour productivity), $K$ is the markup, and lower-case variables denote corresponding rates of change.

1. $w = f(U)$
2. $P = (1 + K) \frac{W}{Q}$
3. $p = (1 + K) + w - q$

If the markup is fixed, we have,

4. $w = p + q$

Substituting back into Equation 1:

5. $p = f(U) - q$

Cost push and the end of perfect competition

“Some holders of this view [cost push] attribute the push to wage boosts engineered unilaterally by strong unions. But others give as much or more weight to the co-operative action of all sellers—organized and unorganized labor, semimonopolistic managements, oligopolistic sellers in imperfect commodity markets—who raise prices and costs in an attempt by each to maintain or raise his share of national income, and who among themselves, by trying to get more than 100 per cent of the available output, create ‘seller’s inflation . . . to explain possible cost-push inflation, it would seem more economical from the very beginning to recognize that imperfect competition is the essence of the problem and drop the perfect competition assumptions.”

“Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve”

\[ p_t = f_1(U_t) + p_t^e \]

\[ p_t^e = f_2(p_t) \]
**Rational Expectations**

### General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP)

![Graph showing General Government Final Consumption Expenditure for High Income and Low and Middle Income Countries from 1950 to 2010.](image)

**NOTE:** Cutoff point between Middle and High Income countries: 11,906 Gross National Income per Capita in 2008.
**SOURCE:** World Development Indicators 2009

“. . . expectations of firms (or, more generally, the subjective probability distribution of outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction of the theory (or the 'objective' probability distributions of outcomes).”


“. . . expectations of inflation are assumed to be endogenous to the system in a very particular way: they are assumed to be 'rational' in Muth's sense – which is to say that the public's expectations are not systematically worse that the predictions of economic models. This amounts to supposing that the public expectations depend, in the proper way, on the things that economic theory says they ought to.”


\[
p_t^e = E(p_t | I_{t-1})
\]

\[
p_t = E(p_t | I_{t-1}) + u_t
\]

\[
p_t - p_t^e = u_t
\]
Original Phillips Curve?

Adaptive Expectations?

Rational Expectations?
Supply Shocks: The Usual Suspects

“A clear and central villain of the piece is the historically unprecedented rise in commodity prices (mainly food and oil) in 1973-74 and again in 1979-80 that not coincidentally accompanied the two great burst of stagflation.

“... one of the variables that set the stage for the 1970s stagflation was the rise in union power and militancy at the end of the 1960s. ... A real wage boom resulted, which started a squeeze on profits even before 1973. ... It strikes us as misguided to consider the labor market as a perfectly competitive bourse when in almost every OECD economy much of the labor force is unionized and governments play an enormous role in affecting labour compensation.”


Supply Shocks: The Cruel Dilemmas

“The limited capability of policy to influence supply poses a particularly vexing problem in a stagflationary world since any stabilization policy adopted in response to stagflation is bound to aggravate one of the problems [inflation or unemployment] even as it helps cure the other. Such is the policy dilemma of stagflation.”

FIGURE 10  World prices

SOURCE: IMF
FIGURE 11  Inflation and the Wage Share in the United States

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
**FIGURE 12** Inflation and the Wage Share in Israel

**SOURCE:** Bank of Israel. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics

**Wage push or profit push?**

Price = Unit Wage + Unit Profit

\[ P = W + \pi \]

\[ P = (1+K) \times W \] where \( K = \pi / W \)

- “Wage push” inflation can occur only if \( K \) is fixed.
- If \( K \) is fixed, the rates of change of profit and of wages are the same.
- If the two rates of change are the same, “wage push” inflation must also be “profit push” inflation.
**FIGURE 13  U.S. Inflation and Capital-Labour Redistribution**

* Corporate earnings per share are for the S&P 500. The wage rate is the average hourly earnings in the goods producing private sector till 1963 and in the private sector afterwards.

SOURCE: Standard & Poor’s through Global Insight (series code: EARN500NS for S&P 500 earnings per share); U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics through Global Insight (series codes: AHPGP and AHPEAP for the wage rate; WPINS for the wholesale price index).
FIGURE 14  U.S. Inflation and Capital-Labour Redistribution

FIGURE 15  U.S. Inflation and Differential Accumulation

* The markup is the per cent of net profit in sales. The Fortune 500 markup is the per cent of after tax profit in sales revenues. The business sector markup is computed by dividing total corporate profit after tax with IVA and CCA (from the national income accounts) by total business receipts (from the IRS). The Differential Markup is given by dividing the Fortune 500 markup by the business sector markup.

NOTE: Until 1993, the Fortune 500 list included only industrial corporations (firms deriving at least half their sales revenues from manufacturing or mining). From 1994 onward, the list includes all corporations. For 1992-3, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 106 special charges.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce through Global Insight (series codes: ZAECON for total corporate profit after tax with IVA and CCA; WPINS for the wholesale price index); U.S. Internal Revenue Service; Fortune.
FIGURE 16  Stagflation Index

NOTE: Stagflation Index = (standardized inflation – standardized growth) / 2. Series are measured as 12-month % change and shown as 3-year moving averages. The last data points are for August 2007.

SOURCE: IMF (codes: L64_A_C110 for CPI; L66_N_I_A_C110 for Industrial Production).
FIGURE 17  Amalgamation and Stagflation in the U.S.A.

* Computed as the average of: (1) the standardised deviations from the average rate of unemployment; and (2) the standardized deviation from the average rate of inflation of the GDP implicit price deflator.

** Mergers and acquisitions expressed as a per cent of gross fixed private domestic investment.

NOTE: Series are shown as 5-year moving averages (the first four observations in each series cover data to that point only).