Pensions and Power. The Political and Market Dynamics of Public Pension Plans

Pensions and Power. The Political and Market Dynamics of Public Pension Plans
Kolasi, Erald. (2022). Review of Capital as Power. Vol. 2. No. 2. June. pp. 46-80. (Article - Journal; English).

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Abstract or Brief Description

This paper uses the theory of ‘capital as power’ to analyze the struggle over public pensions in the United States. While mainstream commentators claim that public pensions must be ‘reformed’ because they are ‘under funded’, I argue that the metrics used to make this argument are unsound. Instead, the push to privatize public pension systems is driven less by actual funding problems, and more by the desires of elite investors who seek to control pension capital and reap the enormous investment fees associated with it. I propose that the deconstruction of public pensions is part of a larger effort to undermine collective action, so as to remove resistance to dominant capital.



Publication Type

Article - Journal


deregulation dominant capital pensions privatization


BN Labour
BN Money & Finance
BN Power
BN Policy
BN Region - North America
BN Value & Price
BN Business Enterprise
BN Capital & Accumulation
BN Distribution
BN Institutions

Depositing User

Jonathan Nitzan

Date Deposited

25 Jun 2022 06:20

Last Modified

29 Jun 2022 10:34


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